Proceedings of the 51st Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences | 2018

Complementor-side Ecology and its Implications on Platform Strategy
Sungho Lee
Yonsei University
lshpro77@gmail.com

Sung Joo Bae
Yonsei University
sjbae@yonsei.ac.kr

Abstract
Understanding the complementor behavior and
its implication is the key to understanding platform
dynamics. By using theoretical guides of
organizational ecology, this study analyzed
complementor's various niche strategies and their
implications. Using the data from game industry, our
study shows that the initial entry strategy to increase
the survival rate is to concentrate on a specific game
genre. However, as the platform grows, the
relationship between complementor platform niche
width and the survival rate shows inverted-U shape.
From the perspective of the platform owner, it would
be very difficult to provide various kinds of services
especially at the early stage of developing the
platform if all the complementors become genrespecific. If many complementors choose to provide
services to multiple platforms, it would be very
difficult for the platform owner to provide services
different from other platforms. We provide
interpretations on various strategic implications of
complementor dynamics to the platform strategy.

1. Introduction
Platform is emerging as the core part of value
chains in technology industries, which generates the
value through connecting complementor's effort with
the needs of the users [1, 2]. Due to its ability to
facilitate active interaction among entities, platform
is widely used in various fields [3] and becoming a
dominant business model, especially in the software
industry [4]. Platform consists of end users,
complementors, and platform owners [1, 5-8].
Different participants join a platform and they each
play unique role, which may be opened or closed
depending on the structure of the platform [5, 8-10].
Among these actors, this research paper specifically
focuses on the complementors and how the platform
dynamics impact their strategic behavior.
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While traditional business model involves
upstream suppliers and downstream buyers, the most
distinct feature of the platform is the emergence of
network effect. Network effect implies that the
introduction of new users in the network causes
growth of an existing market [11, 12]. The network
effect in the platform can be subdivided into direct
and indirect network effect. Direct network effect
implies as the number of the platform users increases,
the value of the platform increases as well, resulting
in the attraction of more users [11]. On the other hand,
indirect network effect exerts influence on the
complementors. Increased number of users in the
platform promotes the growth of the platform. This
motivates complementors to make platform-specific
investment by developing service and deciding to
join the platform [13].
Although existing studies have provided deep
insights into various strategies of platform owners to
facilitate network effect and platform growth, limited
attention has been paid to understand the strategy and
motivation of complementors. Some scholars
observed the effect of complementors or users joining
multiple platforms which is known as multi-homing
[14-18]. However, studies were performed with
viewpoint of owners and do not include the effect of
platform growth on complementors and their
strategic behaviors. Without their willingness to
make investment to the application development of a
platform, the platform is unable to attract users [9].
Hence, it is important to understand the strategic
behavior of the complementors who act as providers
of services in a platform. Throughout the paper, we
attempt to offer the interpretation behind strategic
actions of complementors with the theories from
organizational ecology (OE).
Building on
organizational ecology theory, we investigate the
strategies adopted by the complementors during the
entry to the platform and growth of the platform.
Furthermore, we analyze the effects of different
strategies of the complementors on the platform in
game industry.
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To sum up, this research investigates the strategic
behavior of complementors by focusing on two major
research questions: (1) How does platform’s creation
and growth affect the complementors? (2) What
strategies do the complementors implement for their
survival and growth, and how do they affect platform
in turn? By providing answers to these research
questions, this study contributes to literature of
platform in several ways. First, we observe the effect
of platform growth on complementors and attempt to
extend previous research by providing explanation
for dynamics of complementors using the density
dependence theory of organizational ecology. Second,
we consider strategies of complementors when they
are participating in multi-platforms. Third, we
examine
various
strategies
executed
by
complementors and their effects on the platforms in
two different situations: when the complementors are
entering to the platform and when the platform is
expanding.

separate populations. Interaction between them
results in the growth of platforms by promoting
network effect. Expansion of the platform implies
more opportunity is provided for the complementors
to make a sale, but it also means that new
complementors are introduced to the platform,
increasing the competition level. According to OE,
organizations compete within a physically limited
area also known as a region [29]. Likewise,
complementor is able to provide their services only
through the platform, therefore, in other words,
complementors operate within the boundary of the
platform. However, this boundary is not a closed
boundary. Rather, it can be considered as an open
boundary because it allows complementors to join or
leave to different platform, which is one of the
strategies complementors employ for their growth
and survival. Thus, in a platform, complementors are
able to freely select and migrate to different
platforms or even join multiple platform at a time,
providing services to users.

2. Literature review and hypothesis
2.1. Organizational ecology in platform

2.2. Network effect & density dependency in
platform

Theory of OE provides a useful tool to apprehend
organizational diversity and dynamics by revealing
effects of exogenous organizational factors and
endogenous organizational factors on the founding,
growth, and failure of organization [19]. Exogenous
factors include social resources, political power, and
technological innovation that are not under the
control of the organization [20]. On the contrary, the
endogenous factors that cause the dynamics of
population and the interactions of organization are
the population density, age, size of organization,
niche width, and location [21-24]. As follows,
research in OE considers both exogenous and
endogenous factors as the causes of the various
changes to the organization. Furthermore, as a
prevalent framework for understanding the
organization as an outcome of competition and
selection processes, OE emphasizes the acquisition of
niche. A niche refers to the segment in the market
defined by the resources required for organizational
survival [25, 26]. Depending on the size of niche,
organization can be categorized into specialists and
generalists [25]. As the resource becomes scarce in
the
environment,
competition
progressively
intensifies, interfering the founding and evolution of
organizations [25, 27, 28].
In this paper, we attempt to view platform with
the theoretical lens of OE. In the platform, platform
owners and complementors are considered as having

In the platform, although network effect acts
favorably for platform owners by attracting more
users and complementors, from the perspective of the
complementor, increased number of complementors
by the network effect can influence them negatively
through the density effect. As the platform expand,
not only new users join the platform but
complementors participate into the platform. As the
number of complementors increases, it creates
competitive situation for the complementors,
threatening the survival of the complementors.
Specifically, density dependence theory argues that
the change in population density leads to the process
of organization’s legitimation and competition [30].
The concept of localized competition in OE
distinguishes
competition
into
two
types:
organizations within the entire population and
competition among organizations that are locally
close [29]. First, when the concept of organizational
competition within the entire population is applied to
the complementors, complementors do not
necessarily have to go through the process of
legitimation. In the early days of the market, the
social legitimacy of the market is fairly weak, thus it
is not viewed as an attractive for the complementor to
invest in due to the difficulty in the resources
acquisition. However, platform owners promote the
participation of new users to the market, which
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enhances the network effect and increases the value
of the market [11]. Increased value leads to the
expansion of the market where complementor can
provide services, thereby enhancing the legitimacy.
Thus, once the platform owner population develops
legitimacy, it facilitates the participation of new
complementors into the platform. By participating in
to the market where legitimacy is already developed,
complementors can omit the process of legitimacy
but experiences the process of competition right away
as the density increases. If the process of legitimation
was necessary for the complementors, the mortality
rate should decrease as density increases until the
process of competition begins. Thus, a positive
relationship between population density of
complementors and their organizational mortality
should be observed right away.
H1a: There is a positive relationship between
population density of complementors and their
organizational mortality.
It is also important to examine the competition of
complementors within a platform, which can be
perceived as a localized competition among
organizations that are locally close [29]. Although
there is competition among organizations within the
entire population, severe competition is also observed
within the platform. The boundary of the platform is
an open boundary which allows complementors to
move freely from the one platform to another
according to their strategic decisions. This causes
constant changes in the density of complementors in
a platform. Thus, due to the unique feature of the
platforms, not only the population density is
important but also the density of the complementors
in the platform needs to be taken into account.
Similarly, complementors do not have to experience
the process of legitimation because the formation of
the platform implies that legitimacy already exists.
The legitimacy of platform is directly transferred to
complementors, exposing to the competition effect
from early on. As density of complementors in
platform continues to increase, competition among
complementors intensifies, which results in higher
mortality rate. Therefore, we made the following
assumptions regarding the effect of complementor
density in platform.
H1b: There is a positive relationship between density
and mortality of complementors within platform.

2.3. Complementor’s niche strategy in
platform

Niche is a resource for organization’s survival and
growth, and it can also be perceived as a range of its
activities [21], thus complementors must secure niche.
Depending on the degree of width, organization can
be classified in to a generalist (wide niche) or a
specialist (narrow niche). Niche is not only a physical
resource required for an organization to survive, but
it is also associated with an identity, an perception
that external audience have regards the organization
[31, 32]. Furthermore, a platform NW strategy, is
also associated with multi-homing in platform studies.
Complementor adopting multi-homing strategy
would reduce differentiation between platforms [17,
33]. While most of multi-homing studies discuss the
effects of multi-homing on the platform [15, 16, 18],
few studies are related to the the advantages
complemetors gained by implementing the multihoming strategy [34-36].
If the behavior of the organization is aligned with
its identity, their value will be recognized by
customers, but customers will devalue the
organization if the behavior and identity are not
coordinated [31, 37]. For instance, an organization
with simple identity has the advantage of allowing
customers to easily recognize and classify the
organization. However, the simple identity constrains
the organization to pursue various strategic actions
[38]. On the other hand, organizations with
complicated identities are not subject to specific
categories, thus less constrained by organizational
behavior. However, this makes it difficult for
customers to recognize and specify their identities
[39]. As such, niche can be perceived as the both a
necessary resource as well as the identity
To quickly obtain network effect and secure user
base, in terms of niche, there are two strategic
choices that complementors need to decide: platform
niche width (platform range) and genre niche width
(service range) First, platform niche width (NW)
refers to the platform scope of the complementors.
While organizations compete in a regionally limited
and fixed area, complementors can decide to join a
single or multiple platforms freely according their
strategy. Depending on whether complementors
execute strategy of generalist or specialist, there are
different advantages and disadvantages in terms of
customer base and platform technology optimization.
If complementors decide to adopt generalist strategy
and provides services across multiple platforms with
wide platform NW, the organization is able to
quickly increase the network effect through its broad
customer base in multiple platforms [40]. Generalist
strategy have advantage of distributing the risks
associated with high development costs [34].
However, disadvantage of a generalist strategy
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includes high development cost due to customization
of the services according to the technical features of
each platform, which may result in the low service
quality. On the other hand, if complementors adopt
the strategy of specialist by narrowing platform NW
and providing service to a single platform, it is highly
likely that a complementors are able to provide
optimized services to the platform. But, because
specialist strategy targets specific platform,
complementors retain narrow customer base and is
greatly influenced by that particular platform.
Second decision that the complementor has to
make is genre NW, customer base that
complementors aim to satisfy through their services.
Genre NW strongly affects the ‘identity’ that is
formed amongst the audience. Audience views these
organizational properties and builds expectation
toward the organization. These expectations often
constrain the activities of organization because
observation made by the audience whether the
organization violate or satisfy the codes impacts the
audience’s social approval of an organization. If
complementors adopt the wide genre NW of
generalist, it can secure wide customer base by
satisfying diverse preferences of users. In addition,
complementors
can
flexibly
respond
to
environmental changes, such as changes in the user
taste.
However,
complicated
identity
of
complementors makes it difficult for users to
recognize the organization quickly [38, 39, 41]. On
the other hand, the complementors, who choose the
genre NW of specialist, has the advantage of
organizational identity being promptly recognized by
the user and quickly acquiring the customer base in a
specific service area. However, when complementors
with the identity as the specialist attempt to broaden
the NW, users may devalue their action and feel
resistance. Likewise, platform NW and genre NW
strategies of generalist and specialist exhibit different
advantages and disadvantages in terms of customer
segment and identity.

Figure 1. OE in Platform

2.4. Entry strategy of complementor to a
platform
When
participating
in
the
platform,
complementors select platform NW and genre NW
strategy [42]. In the case of platform NW, it is
beneficial for complementors to adopt generalist’s
platform NW strategy. It allows them to serve
multiple platforms and lower their mortality rate.
Because the entry cost to platform is relatively low,
participating to multiple platform is not difficult,
allowing the benefit of acquiring greater number of
users [42]. Although there are risks of not being able
to develop high quality services due to the different
platform’s technological environments, the wide
platform NW reduces the risk of service failures by
broadening the organizational activity to multiple
platforms. By preventing the risk of the service
failure, it lowers the dependency of complementors
on a specific platform, thereby providing autonomy
to the organizational activity. In addition, it is
possible to enjoy economies of scale and scope by
creating large-scale services based on a broad
customer base. Therefore, we made the following
assumption for platform NW of generalist and
organizational mortality rate when complementors
enter to the platform.
H2: There is a negative relationship between entry
platform NW and mortality of complementors.
In reference to the complementors’ genre NW
during the entry to the platform, complementors with
narrow genre NW will have lower possibility of
failure. Executing genre NW of specialist allows
complementors to provide high quality and
specialized services to users by focusing on a specific
service genre. The strategy of service diversification
eases the process of expanding service in the future,
which implies to the high level of adaptability to
external environmental changes [39]. However, in the
early stage of the organization, factors such as
immature organizational capacity and limited
resources constrain the organizational activity [19].
Therefore, it is better for complementors to provide a
high-quality and specialized service. Additionally, a
strategy to focus organizational capabilities on a
specific genre allows users to quickly recognize an
organization as a specialist (Hsu & Hannan, 2005),
which results in the securing users quickly with
specialized service and promoting the network effect.
Based on distinct identity and differentiated
competitiveness during the early stage, the
complementor is able to quickly attract users and
lower the mortality rate of organization. Therefore,
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we made the following assumption for genre NW of
specialist strategy and organizational mortality rate
when complementors enter the platform.
H3: There is a positive relationship between entry
genre NW and mortality of complementors.

2.5. Complementors’ niche strategy in
platform growth
As the platform grows, complementors may alter
strategy of platform NW and genre NW to survive in
a competitive market. However, their strategies may
differ from those adopted when entering to the
platform. As competition becomes more intense
within the platform, complementors adopt platform
NW strategy of specialist or generalist and both of
the strategy positively affect the organizational
survival. If complementors implement platform NW
of specialist, it increases the survival rate by
expanding users with specialized services that target
the specific customer base [43]. It also enhances the
expertise, thus increase the chance of organization's
survival. Moreover, it provides a strong relationship
with the platform owner that offers opportunity for
complementors to secure additional resources and
special attention. On the other hand, it is also
beneficial for complementors to execute the
generalist’s platform NW strategy. Participating into
multiple platforms results in the market
diversification [44]. Furthermore, it leads to the
expansion of customer base, risk distribution,
economies of scale, and lowers the organization's
mortality rate. Therefore, implementing either one of
the strategy will lower the mortality rate of the
complementor. However, expanding services from a
single platform to multiple platforms requires
conversion of existing service because each platform
is characterized by different technological features.
This process requires additional investment for
developing optimized services for each platform and
maintenance cost. If complementors lack capability
and resources, the process of adopting a generalist
strategy would increase the mortality rate. But the
process of continuously broadening platform NW
facilitates accumulation of knowledge regarding
technology and service maintenance and eventually
enhances the organizational capability. Therefore, we
made the following assumption for platform NW and
organization mortality rate in the competitive
environment.
H4: There is an inverted-U relationship between a
platform NW and mortality of a complementor.

Second, complementors can similarly change
genre NW as the platform grows by implementing
either one of specialist or generalist’s strategy. If a
complementors adopt strategy of specialist with
narrow genre NW, it increases organizational
capabilities for that genre and lower the rate of
organizational mortality. But, as competition
intensifies, complementors attempt to increase
organizational viability through broadening genre
NW. A strategy that meets various needs of users
through a wide range of genres can provide new
value to existing users and attract new users who are
not satisfied with current services. Especially, it can
reduce the risk that is associated with the evaporation
of demand within the specific genre. However, if
complementors has imprinted their identity as
specialist to users, users may feel reluctant to
complementors, broadening genre NW and
modifying the identity, [45]. Also, the expansion of
genre NW from narrow to wide requires new
organizational capabilities and additional resources to
develop services in new genres. Nonetheless, in long
term, the strategy of expanding genre NW widens
scope of organizational activities, thus reduces the
organization's mortality rate. Once complementors
develop capability to create high quality games in
different genres and establish identities as a generalist,
this can be extremely beneficial. Therefore, we made
the following assumption for genre NW and
organization mortality rate in competitive
environment.
H5: There is an inverted-U relationship between a
genre NW and mortality of a complementor.

3. Research and method
The game industry can be perceived as a typical
platform industry composed of a game console
company as a platform owner, game developer as a
complementor, and game players as users. The data
was collected from 1977 to 2014, which is a
sufficient period to observe the founding and failure
of complementors.

3.1. Data
We targeted video game developers from 1977 to
2014 in order to analyze the strategic behaviors of the
complementors. We collected data regarding the
game company history and game titles released by
game developers. Then collected data was crossvalidated with video game open sites such as
"Mobygames.com", "Vgchartz.com", and Wikipedia.
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The final data includes 1,737 game developers,
excluding the companies that do not have company
history information and released game information.

3.2. Variable
3.2.1. Mortality event
The reasons for game developer failure can
vary, but mainly they can be classified into three
categories: 1) disbanding of the firm; 2) exit to
another industry; and 3) merger or acquisition by
another firm. We categorized firms into two types: 1)
disbanding of the firm if firm is recorded by
bankruptcy or close and 2) exit to another industry in
our data but there aren’t cases of type 2. Also, we did
not included third types because it was difficult to
decide whether the merger was due to success or
failure of the firm’s game.
3.2.2. Population variable
Population Density: It is defined as the number of
organizations in the game developer population in
each year. Founding point of organization is
measured as January of the year, and failure point of
organization is measured as December of year.
Platform Density: It represents a number of
complementors
within
a
platform
which
complementor participate in. If a complementor is
participating in multiple platforms, we sum densities
of complementors in each platforms. Finally we
calculate the platform density by adding weight
which refers to a number of platform that
complementor participate in.

D : The number of complementors participated in
platform i each year.
: The portion of density of platform i out of
sum of density from all platform each year.
: Whether the complementor j releases game
title in platform i each year or not.
3.2.3. Organizational variable
Age: The time from creation of the organization
to the time of the death is measured.
Size: The size of the organization can be
measured in various ways such as the sales of the
organization or the number of employees. However,

the organization size is relatively small in the game
platforms, resembling the venture company. Thus,
the number of game titles is employed to measure the
size of organization.
Organization Niche Width: platform niche refers
to the scope where the game developers aims to
release the game, while genre niche represents the
genre scope of game. In this paper, we categorize 34
game platforms, including game consoles and mobile
game platforms developed by game platform
manufactures. Game genres are categorized into eight
genres: action, adventure, education, racing, role
playing, simulation, and sports. Platform NW and
genre NW in the game industry can be understood in
terms of concentration of game developer on the
platform and on the genre when launching the game.
For example, if the games are released to multiple
platforms, the platform NW is perceived as less
concentrated. Also, if the complementor develops
several genres of games, the genre NW is described
as less focused. We use HHI (Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index) to measure concentration on platform and
genre [46]. The HHI is a measurement of the
concentration in the industry and is suitable for
measuring platform concentration and genre
concentration. However, the lower the concentration
of HHI, that is, the more convergent to 0, the larger
the Niche. Therefore, for the sake of cognitive
convenience, the HHI value was inversely
transformed so that the HHI value increases as the
Niche width increases.

Genre Niche Width: 1/HHI (N: Number of Genre
each year, : Portion of Genre j in Released Game
each year )
Platform Niche Width: 1/HHI (N: Number of
Platform by year,
: Portion of Platform j in
Released Game each year )
Platform Entry Strategy: We measured platform
NW and Genre NW for three years after the game
developers participate in the game platform and
launched games for the first time. According to the
ESA data in 2013, the average period of game
development is 1.6 years. Hence, the period of three
years is sufficient time to observe the initial platform
entry strategy.
Niche Width Strategy: We measured the Platform
NW and Genre NW for three years. The three-year
period was decided considering the average game
development period of 1.6 years.
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3.2.4. Environment variable
Market Size: Changes in the size of the game
market affect the growth of the platform, thus we
reflect the revenue of the game industry as a variable.
Recession: Economic downturn is considered as
an external factor and it is treated as a dummy
variable.
Industry Event: In order to reflect the
characteristics of the game industry, the bankruptcy
timing of game industry due to low quality game
from 1983 to 1985 is included.
Technology Change: In the case of video consoles,
due to the technological innovation, the game
platform manufacture introduces new game console
periodically. Research model reflects the timing of
technology changes as dummy variables since they
have a great impact on the platform industry.
Platform Dummy: Each platform has different
business policy and technological characteristics. We
included characteristics of 31 platform to model as
dummy variable.
Genre Dummy: We categorized game title into
8 types (action, adventure, education, racing, roleplaying, simulation, sports, and strategy) which is
based on “mobygames.com” and “Vgchartz.com”.
We reflected genre to model as dummy variable.
3.2.5. Model specification and estimation
We use a piecewise constant exponential model in
history analysis that does not assume any specific
pattern between age and mortality. A piecewise
constant exponential model divides organizational
age into several periods, and then calculates the
relationship between organizational age and mortality
rate within each period. In this case, the mortality rate
in each period has the maximum value allowed by the
data without any assumption, and has the same
mortality rate within each period. The total duration
of the organizational age is divided into section
and is divided into P
sections with the assumption of
. The
interval setting is divided into seven intervals 0 2921
5112 6573 9130 9860 10226 through several
measurements with reference to the life table.
Therefore, the mortality rate of the organization in
the
individual
section
is
expressed
as
. Here,
is the mortality
rate of the organization in the interval p, and

is

the baseline hazard of the interval p.
is the
covariate variable that affects the mortality rate of the

organization. In this paper, market size, recession,
industry event, and technology change are included
as external variables and organization size is included
as an intrinsic variable of the organization.

4. Finding
To test our hypotheses, we use the piecewise
constant exponential model. In each model, market
size, recession, industry event, technology change
and effect of age are included. Model 1 includes only
population density and platform density and in model
2, we add the entry NW. For model 3, current NW
such as platform NW and genre NW are incorporated.
Finally, model 4 provides the full model with all
controls and independent variables.
Table 1. Complementor’s survival analysis
Label
Firm’s Size
Market Size
Recession
Industry Event
Tech. Change
Population Density
Platform Density
Entry Platform NW
Entry Genre NW
Current Platform NW
Current Platform NW

Min
0
400
0
0
0
4
0
0
0
0
0

Max

Mean

200
76000
1
1
1
2162
21994
7.758
4.571
7.758
4.898

1.36
46504
0.249
0.014
0.329
1652.0
1148.2
0.81
0.659
1.292
1.115

Std.
Dev.
4.467
18515
0.433
0.119
0.47
599.76
1819.2
1.183
1.003
1.042
0.781

To investigate the effects of environmental factors
in game platform industry, we statistically analyze
the effect of market size, recession, industry event
and technology change. The results show that market
size lowered the mortality rate of complementors by
expanding market space and niche space where
complementors can actively provide their services.
Atari Shock, representing the industry period variant,
has significant effect on the complementor’s
mortality rate by providing of low-quality games to
users and threating credibility of the game industry.
In terms of technology change in the platform, game
console manufactures periodically replace platform
console due to the introduction of technological
innovation to the game industry. This technological
advance is perceived as an opportunity for
complementors to provide new games based on
platform's innovative technology, but it can also act
as a threat for the organization if organization fails to
adapt the technology.
In H1a, we propose that there is a positive
relationship between population density of
complementors and their organizational mortality. In
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Table 2, we note a positive coefficient for the
population density of complementors and their
organizational mortality (Model I: beta=0.874, p<.05),
in support of H1a. Additionally, we test the positive
effect of platform density of complementors on

mortality of a complementor within a platform, in
H1b. Because the results show that the coefficient is
positive (Model I: beta=0.289, p<.001), they support
H1b.

Table 2. Complementor’s survival analysis
Variable
Organization
Age1
Age2
Age3
Age4
Age5
Age6
Age7
Size
Environment
Market Size
Recession
Industry Event
Technology Change
Population
Population Density(log)
Platform Density(log)
Platform1~Platform31
Genere1 ~ Genre8
Entry Niche Width
Platform NW
Genre NW
Current Niche Width
Platform NW
Platform NW^2
Genre NW
Genre NW^2

Model I

Model II

Model III

Model IV

-17.689(2.448)***
-17.439(2.451)***
-17.314(2.457)***
-17.402(2.466)***
-17.43(2.521)***
-17.599(2.648)***
-17.302(2.493)***
-0.022(0.026)

-18.257(2.46)***
-18.018(2.463)***
-17.919(2.471)***
-18.028(2.48)***
-18.088(2.536)***
-18.246(2.661)***
-17.966(2.508)***
-0.02(0.026)

-19.758(2.529)***
-19.545(2.533)***
-19.451(2.541)***
-19.548(2.552)***
-19.615(2.607)***
-19.782(2.729)***
-19.477(2.579)***
-0.015(0.026)

-19.72(2.531)***
-19.52(2.535)***
-19.443(2.543)***
-19.553(2.554)***
-19.64(2.609)***
-19.789(2.731)***
-19.502(2.581)***
-0.017(0.026)

-0.00002(6e-06)***
0.354(0.156)*
2.177(0.828)**
-0.294(0.162)+

-0.00002(6e-06)***
0.356(0.156)*
2.233(0.831)**
-0.294(0.162)+

-0.00002(6e-06)***
0.354(0.156)*
2.344(0.837)**
-0.305(0.162)+

-0.00002(6e-06)***
0.355(0.156)*
2.325(0.84)**
-0.301(0.162)+

0.874(0.36)*
0.289(0.058)***
omitted
omitted

0.904(0.361)*
0.238(0.061)***
omitted
omitted

1.142(0.365)**
0.142(0.069)*
omitted
omitted

1.024(0.365)**
0.145(0.069)*
omitted
omitted

0.093(0.086)
0.38(0.11)***

-0.051(0.105)
0.309(0.121)*
1.013(0.306)***
-0.134(0.058)*
0.691(0.515)
-0.129(0.131)

1.017(0.315)***
-0.13(0.058)*
0.427(0.525)
-0.098(0.131)

*** P<0.001, ** P<0.01, * P<0.05, + P<0.1 estimated standard errors are in parentheses
We propose that there is a negative relationship
between entry platform NW and morality of a
complementor in H2, but the result shows that H2 is
not statistically significant. In the hypothesis, we
assume that when complementors adopt generalist’s
platform NW by providing services to multiple
platforms, they are able to expand the customer base
quickly, thereby increasing the likelihood of service
success and lowering the mortality rate. However,
statistic results reveal that generalist strategy did not
positively impact the survival of the complementors.
This result can be explained in terms of organizational
capability. If complementors provide games to multiple
platforms, it is necessary to convert the games
according to specific technology of each platform. This
requires organizational capability that enables the
development of a game in multiple versions and

achievement of the same quality level for each
platform. However, right after the founding of the
organization, complementors do not have sufficient
organizational competence to do so, thus the strategy
of broadening platform NW does not have significant
impact on the complementor’s mortality rate.
In the case of H3, we predict that entry genre NW
would positively affect the mortality of a
complementor and we note a positive coefficient for
the entry NW and mortality of a complementor (Model
II: beta=0.38, p<.001), supporting H3. Hence, focusing
on specialized genres is beneficial for the organization
survival.
In H4, we predict that there is an inverted Urelationship between a platform NW and mortality of a
complementor. According to Table 2 platform NW
related positively to mortality of a complementor
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(Model III: beta=1.013, p<.001), but the quadratic term
exhibited a negative relationship (Model III: beta=0.134, p<.05). Therefore, a platform NW display a
curvilinear relationship with mortality of a
complementor, in support of H4. Lastly, we propose
that there is an inverted-U relationship between genre
NW and mortality of a complementor in H5.
Statistically, H5 is not supported which may be due to
the unique feature of the game industry. In the game
industry, it seems that other factors such as the
characters in the game greatly influence the
development of identity. When the game is introduced
for the first time to the users, there is no information
regarding the complementor, so the users evaluate the
organization based on the game genre. As the number
of user increases, users tend to develop the identity of
complementors based on the characters of the game,
representing the game developer. Thus, the effect of
genre on the development of identity becomes limited.

5. Discussion
In this study, we observe the two aspects of
network effect. First aspect has positive impacts by
facilitating the growth of the platform, while second
aspect involves negative effect on the complementors
by increasing their mortality rate. In the platform
environment, the complementor uses different
strategies in a timely manner. When entering to a
platform, by focusing on specific genres with a
specialist’s narrow genre NW, the complementor
allows quick recognition of the organizational identity
by the users. On the other hand, when the platform is
growing, complementors adapt one of either platform
NW of a generalist or a specialist. Broadening platform
NW expands customer base by providing services to
multiple platforms while narrow platform NW offers
the capability to provide optimized service to users in a
specific platform.
Through the statistical analyses, we confirm that
the strategic behaviors of the complementor impact the
entire platform in several ways. First, the competition
among complementors resulted from the platform
growth increases the mortality rate of complementors,
which acts as an obstacle for the platform owner to
continually provide new services. Hence, the platform
owner needs to adopt strategy such as complementor
management strategy and strategic alliance that enables
platform to continuously attract new complementors
into the platform and retain them. Second, in the early
stage of the platform, although implementing
specialist’s genre NW decreases the mortality rate, it
also prevents platform owners to provide a variety of
services to the users. As not being able to provide

diversified services to the users, the ability of platform
to attract new users and facilitate network effect is
limited. Thus, the platform owner must prevent the
situation of complementors’ services being biased
toward a specific genre at the early phase of the
platform.
This study includes several limitations that need to
be taken into account in interpreting the results. First,
during the process of statistical analysis, we include the
characteristic of platform as a dummy variable.
Nonetheless, each platform possesses unique
characteristic that represents the technological aspect
of the platform and policy that influence the strategic
decision of complementors. Second, this research
examines the strategy of complementors in platforms
during the entrance and growth. However, the platform
itself also experiences the process of founding,
expansion and obsolescence and these the platform
lifecycle influences the strategic behaviors of the
complementors. However, we did not incorporate
lifecycle of platform.
In sum, we investigate the strategic behaviors of
complementors and their impacts on the platform. This
paper provides theory and interpretations on various
strategic behaviors of complementor. By understanding
complementors’ strategic behaviors and their effects on
the platform dynamics, we suggest that the platform
owner needs to flexibly cope with the strategic changes
of individual complementor.
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